In Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the Southern District of New York considered Spokeo’s standing analysis in the context of the Michigan Preservation of Personal Privacy Act. The analysis on Spokeo reflects a burgeoning consensus:
The PPPA’s requirement that notice be provided to the customer of the ability to “remove his or her name at any time by written notice,” PPPA § 3(d), gives individuals the opportunity to prohibit disclosure of their protected information…. If, as [plaintiff] alleges, Condé Nast failed to give her notice and an opportunity to opt out, then the disclosure of her PRI would have violated the PPPA’s substantive disclosure prohibition.
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[W]e also conclude that the asserted harm is sufficiently concrete. In light of the related aims of the two statutes, it is significant that all courts to consider the question, including this one, have concluded—both pre-and post-Spokeo—that consumers alleging that a defendant violated the VPPA by “knowingly disclos[ing] their [personally identifiable information] to a third party without their consent have satisfied the concreteness requirement for Article III standing.” Yershov v. Gannet Satellite Info. Network, Inc., ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, No. 14–13112–FDS, 2016 WL 4607868, at *7 (D.Mass. Sept. 2, 2016); see, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir.2016) (finding harm “concrete” because it “involves a clear de facto injury, i.e., the unlawful disclosure of legally protected information”); Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 623 (7th Cir.2014); Austin–Spearman v. AMC Network Entm’t LLC, 98 F.Supp.3d 662, 668 (S.D.N.Y.2015).